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Abstract
We consider a pure exchange nancial economy, where rational agents, possibly
asymmetrically informed, forecast prices privately and, therefore, face exogenous
uncertainty, on the future state of nature, and endogenous uncertainty, on future
prices. At a sequential equilibrium, all agents expect the trueprice as a possible
outcome and elect optimal strategies at the rst period, which clear on all markets
ex post. We introduce no-arbitrage prices and display their revealing properties.
Under mild conditions, we show that a sequential equilibrium exists, whatever the
nancial structure and agentsprivate information or beliefs. This result suggests
that existence problems of standard sequential models, following Hart (1975) or
Radner (1979), stem from the rational expectation and perfect foresight assumptions.
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1 Introduction
The traditional approach to sequential nancial equilibrium relies on Radners
(1972-1979) classical, but restrictive, assumptions that agents have the so-called
rational expectationsof private information signals, and perfect foresightof future
prices. Along the former assumption, agents are endowed, quoting Radner, with
a model of how equilibrium prices are determined and (possibly) infer private
information of other agents from comparing actual prices and price expectations
with theoretical values at a price revealing equilibrium. Along the latter assumption,
agents anticipate with certainty exactly one price for each commodity (or asset) in
each prospective state, which turns out to be the true price if that state prevails.
Both assumptions presume much of agentsinference capacities. Both assumptions
lead to classical cases of inexistence of equilibrium, as shown by Radner (1979),
Hart (1975), Momi (2000), Busch-Govindan (2004), among others. Building on our
earlier papers, we argue hereafter that the relevance and properties of the sequential
equilibrium model can jointly be improved, if we drop these standard assumptions.
In a rst model [4], dropping rational expectations only, we provided the basic
tools, concepts and properties for an arbitrage theory, embedding jointly the sym-
metric and asymmetric information settings. In this model, we showed in [6], stan-
dard existence problems of asymmetric information vanished, namely, a nancial
equilibrium with nominal assets existed, not only generically - as in Radners (1979)
rational expectations model - but under the very same no-arbitrage condition, with
symmetric or asymmetric information, namely, under the generalized no-arbitrage
condition introduced in [4]. This result was consistent and extended David Cass
(1984) standard existence theorem to the asymmetric information setting.
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We now drop both assumptions of rational expectations and perfect foresight,
letting agents form their anticipations privately. Thus, rational agents can no longer
be certain which price might prevail, as in the classical model. Equilibrium prices
now depend on all agentsforecasts today, which are private knowledge. So, agents
also face uncertainty about future prices. To encapture this, we introduce a two-
period pure exchange economy, where agents, possibly asymmetrically informed,
face exogenous uncertainty, represented by nitely many states of nature, exchange
consumption goods on spot markets, and - nominal or real - assets on nancial
markets, but also face an endogenous uncertaintyon future prices, in each state
they expect. Agents now have private sets of price forecasts, distributed along idio-
syncratic probability laws, called beliefs. We refer to the latter uncertainty as en-
dogenous because it both a¤ects and is attached to the endogenous price variables.
The current models equilibrium, or correct foresight equilibrium (C.F.E.), is
reached when all agents, today, anticipate tomorrows trueprice as a possible out-
come, and elect optimal strategies, which clear on all markets at every time-period.
This equilibrium concept is, indeed, a sequential one. It di¤ers from the traditional
temporary equilibrium notion, introduced by Hicks (1939) and developed, later, by
Grandmont (1977, 1982), Green (1973), Hammond (1983), Balasko (2003), among
others. With temporary equilibrium, anticipations may also be set exogenously, but
can lead agents, ex post, to revise their plans and beliefs, face bankruptcy or welfare
increasing retrade opportunities. Such outcomes are inconsistent with our model.
After presenting the model, we introduce a notion of no-arbitrage prices, which
always exist, encompass equilibrium prices, and may reveal information to agents
having no clue of how equilibrium prices are determined. We show that any agent
can infer enough information from such prices to free markets from arbitrage.
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Next, we study the existence issue, and suggest the correct foresight equlibrium
may solve the classical existence problems, which followed, not only Radners (1979)
rational expectations equilibrium (as we had already shown in [6]), but also Hart
(1975), Momi (2001), Busch-Govindan (2004), among others. We prove hereafter
that a C.F.E. exists whenever agentsanticipations embed a so-called minimum
uncertainty set, corresponding to the incompressible uncertainty which may remain
in a private belief economy. Thus, equilibrium prices always exist, and reveal to
rational agents, whenever required, their own sets of anticipations at equilibrium.
The paper is organized as follows: we present the model, in Section 2, the concept
of no-arbitrage prices and the information they reveal, in Section 3, the minimum
uncertainty set and the existence Theorem, in Section 4. We prove this theorem, in
Section 5, di¤ering to an Appendix the proof of technical Lemmas.
2 The basic model
We consider a pure-exchange economy with two periods (t 2 f0; 1g), a commodity
market and a nancial market, where agents (at t = 0) may be asymmetrically
informed and face an endogenous uncertainty on future prices. The sets of agents,
I := f1; :::;mg, commodities, L := f1; :::; Lg, states of nature, S := f1; :::; Ng, and assets,
J := f1; :::; Jg, are all nite (i.e., (m;L;N; J) 2 N4).
2.1 The models notations
Throughout, we denote by  the scalar product and k:k the Euclidean norm on
an Euclidean space and by B(K) the Borel sigma-algebra of a topological space, K.
We let s = 0 be the non-random state at t = 0 and S 0 := f0g[S. For all set   S 0
and tuple (s; l; x; x0; y; y0) 2 LRRRLRL, we denote by:
3
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 xs 2 R, ys 2 RL the scalar and vector, indexed by s 2 , of x, y, respectively;
 yls the lth component of ys 2 RL;
 x 6 x0 and y 6 y0 (respectively, x << x0 and y << y0) the relations xs 6 x0s
and yls 6 y0ls (resp., xs < x0s and yls < y0ls ) for each (l; s) 2 f1; :::; Lg;
 x < x0 (resp., y < y0) the joint relations x 6 x0, x 6= x0 (resp., y 6 y0, y 6= y0);
 RL+ = fx 2 RL : x > 0g and R+ := fx 2 R : x > 0g,
RL++ := fx 2 RL : x >> 0g and R++ := fx 2 R : x >> 0g;
 M0 := f(p0; q) 2 RL+RJ : kp0k+ kqk = 1g;
 Ms := f(s; p) 2 S  RL+ : kpk = 1g, for every s 2 S;
 M := [s2SMs, a topological subset of the Euclidean space RL+1;
 B(!; ") := f!02M: k!0 !k < "g, for every pair (!; ") 2M R++;
 P () := f!2M : (B(!; "))>"; 8">0g, the support of a probability, , on (M;B(M));
 (P ), for any closed set, P  M, the set of probabilities on (M;B(M)), whose
support (as dened above) is P .
2.2 The commodity and asset markets
The L consumption goods, l 2 L, may be exchanged by consumers, on the spot
markets of both periods. In each state, s 2 S, an expectation of a spot price, p 2 RL+,
or the spot price, p, in state s itself, are denoted by the pair !s := (s; p) 2 SRL+, and
normalized, at little cost, to the above set Ms.
Each agent, i 2 I, is granted an endowment, ei := (eis) 2 RLS0+ , which secures her
the commodity bundle, ei0 2 RL+ at t = 0, and eis 2 RL+, in each state s 2 S, if this
4
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state prevails at t = 1. To harmonize notations, we will also denote ei! := eis, for
every triple (i; s; !) 2 IS0Ms. Ex post, the generic ith agents welfare is measured
by a continuous utility index, ui : R2L+ ! R+, over her consumptions at both dates.
The nancial market permits limited transfers across periods and states, via J
assets, or securities, j 2 J := f1; :::; Jg, which are exchanged at t = 0 and pay o¤, in
commodities and/or in units of account, at t = 1. For any spot price, or expectation,
! 2 M, the cash payo¤s, vj(!) 2 R, of all assets, j 2 f1; :::; Jg, conditional on the
occurence of price !, dene a row vector, V (!) = (vj(!)) 2 RJ . By denition and
from the continuity of the scalar product, the mapping ! 2M 7! V (!) is continuous.
The nancial structure may be incomplete, namely, the span, < (V (!s))s2S > :=
f(V (!s)  z)s2S : z 2 RJg may have lower rank (for all prices (!s) 2 s2S Ms) than
N := #S. From above, assets provide no insurance against endogenous uncertainty.
Agents can take unrestrained positions (positive, if purchased; negative, if sold),
in each security, which are the components of a portfolio, z 2 RJ . Given an asset
price, q 2 RJ , a portofolio, z 2 RJ , is thus a contract, which costs q z units of account
at t = 0, and promises to pay V (!)  z units tomorrow, for each spot price ! 2 M, if
! obtains. Similarly, we normalize rst period prices, !0 := (p0; q), to the set M0.
2.3 Information and beliefs
Ex ante, the generic agent, i 2 I, is endowed with a private idiosyncratic set
of anticipations, Pi  M, according to which she believes tomorrows true price
(i.e., that which will prevail at t = 1) will fall into Pi. Consistently with [4], this
set, Pi  S  RL, encompasses a private information signal, Si  S, that the true
state will be in Si. Agentsare assumed to receive no wrong signal, in the sense
that no state will e¤ectively prevail tomorrow, out of the pooled information set,
5
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S := \iSi. Typically, rational agentsforecasts of the spot prices cannot degenerate to
singletons, since all prices depend on other agentsforecasts, which are private. Yet,
from observing markets (at t = 0), agents may update their beliefs before trading.
Resuming the notations of sub-Section 2.1, this is encaptured in Denition 1.
Denition 1 A closed subset of (S  RL++) \M is called an anticipation set. Its ele-
ments are called anticipations, expectations or forecasts. We denote by A the set of
all anticipation sets. A collection (Pi) 2 Am is called an anticipation structure if:
(a) \mi=1Pi 6= ?.
We denote by AS the set of anticipation structures. A structure, (P 0i ) 2 AS, is said
to rene, or to be a renement of (Pi) 2 AS, and we denote it by (P 0i )  (Pi), if:
(b) P 0i  Pi; 8i 2 I.
A renement, (P 0i ) 2 AS, of (Pi) 2 AS, is said to be self-attainable if:
(c) \mi=1P 0i = \mi=1Pi.
A belief is a probability, , on (M;B(M)), whose support is an anticipation set, i.e.,
P () 2 A, using the notations of sub-Section 2.1. A structure of beliefs is a collection
of beliefs, (i), whose supports dene an anticipation structure (i.e., (P (i)) 2 AS).
We denote by B and SB, respectively, the sets of beliefs and structures of beliefs. A
structure of beliefs, (0i) 2 SB, is said to rene (i) 2 BS, which we denote (0i)  (i),
if the anticipation structure, (P (0i)), renes (P (i)) 2 AS (i.e., (P (0i))(P (i))). A
renement, (0i) 2 SB, of (i) 2 SB is said to be self-attainable if \mi=1P (0i) = \mi=1P (i).
Remark 1 Along the above Denition, an anticipation set is a closed set of spot
prices (at t = 1), whose values are never zero. A belief is a probability distribution
on (M;B(M)), which cannot put a positive weight on arbitrarily low prices. Agents
anticipations or beliefs form a structure when they have some forecasts in common.
The set of common forecasts is left unchanged at a self-attainable renement.
6
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.56
2.4 Consumersbehavior and the notion of equilibrium
Agents implement their decisions at t = 0, when they reach their nal anticipa-
tions, and elect related beliefs, (i) 2 SB, from observing market prices, !0 := (p0; q) 2
M0, along a rational behavior described in Section 3, below. Hereafter, prices and
beliefs at t = 0 are set as given, and markets, consistently, are assumed to have elim-
inated useless deals, so f(zi) 2 RJm :
Pm
i=1 zi = 0; V (!i)zi = 0; 8(i; !i) 2 IP (i)g = f0g.
Agent is consumption set is that of continuous mappings from f0g [ P (i) to RL+,
X(i) := C (f0g [ P (i); RL+) , for each i 2 I.
Thus, her consumptions, x 2 X(i), are mappings, relating s = 0 to a consumption
decision, x0 := x!0 2 RL+, at t = 0, and, continuously on P (i), every expectation,
! := (s; p) 2 P (i), to a consumption decision, x! 2 RL+, at t = 1, which is conditional
on the joint observation of state s, and price p, on the spot market.
Each agent i 2 I elects and implements a consumption and investment decision,
or strategy, (x; z) 2 X(i)RJ , that she can a¤ord on markets, given her endowment,
ei 2 RLS0+ , and her expectation set, P (i). This denes her budget set as follows:
Bi(!0; i) := f(x; z) 2 X(i)RJ : p0(x0 ei0) 6  qz; ps(x! ei!) 6 V (!)z;8! := (s; ps) 2 P (i)g .
An allocation, (xi) 2 X[(i)] := mi=1X(i), is a collection of consumptions across
consumers. We dene the following set of attainable allocations:
A((!s); (i)) := f(xi) 2 X[(i)] :
Pm
i=1(xi0 ei0) = 0;
Pm
i=1(xi!s ei!s) = 0; 8s 2 S; s:t: !s 2 \mi=1P (i)g ,
for every price collection, (!s) := (!s)s2S 2 s2SMs. Each agent i 2 I has preferences
represented by the V.N.M. utility function: x 2 X(i) 7! uii (x) :=
R
!2P (i) ui(x0; x!)di(!) .
7
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The generic ith agent elects a strategy, which maximises her utility function in
the buget set, i.e., a strategy of the set Bi (!0; i) := arg max(x;z)2Bi(!0;i) u
i
i (x). The
above economy is denoted by E . Its equilibrium concept is dened as follows:
Denition 2 A collection of prices, (!s) 2 s2S0Ms, beliefs, (i) 2 SB, and strategies,
(xi; zi) 2 Bi(!0; i), dened for each i 2 I, is a correct foresight equilibrium (C.F.E.),
or sequential equilibrium (respectively, a temporary equilibrium) of the economy E,
if the following Conditions (a)-(b)-(c)-(d) (resp., Conditions (b)-(c)-(d)) hold:
(a) 8s 2 S, !s 2 \mi=1P (i);
(b) 8i 2 I; (xi; zi) 2 Bi (!0; i) := arg max(x;z)2Bi(!0;i) uii (x);
(c) (xi) 2 A((!s); (i));
(d)
Pm
i=1 zi = 0.
Under above conditions, (i) 2 SB, or (!s) 2 s2S0Ms, are said to support equilibrium.
We now present the arbitrage issue, which is closely related to that of existence.
3 No-arbitrage prices and the information they reveal
We dene and characterize no-arbitrage prices and their revealing properties.
3.1 The models no-arbitrage prices
Recalling the notations of sub-Section 2.1, we rst dene no-arbitrage prices.
Denition 3 Let an anticipation set, P 2 A, a belief,  2 (P ) (as denoted in 2.1),
and price, q 2 RJ , be given. Price q is said to be a no-arbitrage price of P (or ), or
P (or ) is said to be q-arbitrage-free, if the following condition holds:
(a) @z 2 RJ :  q  z > 0 and V (!)  z > 0, 8! 2 P () = P , with one strict inequality;
We denote by Q(P ) (or Q()) the set of no-arbitrage prices of P (or ).
8
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Let a structure, (Pi) 2 AS, and, for each i 2 I, the above price set, Q(Pi), be given.
We refer to Qc[(Pi)] := \mi=1Q(Pi) as the set of common no-arbitrage of (Pi) 2 AS.
The structure, (Pi) 2 AS, is said to be arbitrage-free (respectively, q-arbitrage-free)
if Qc[(Pi)] is non-empty (resp., if q 2 Qc[(Pi)]).
We say that q is a no-arbitrage price (resp., a self-attainable no-arbitrage price) of
(Pi) 2 AS if there exists a renement (resp., self-attainable renement), (P i ), of (Pi),
such that q 2 Qc[(P i )]. We denote by Q[(Pi)] the set of no-arbitrage prices of (Pi).
The above denitions and notations extend to any consistent structure of beliefs,
(i) 2 mi=1(Pi), as denoted in sub-Section 2.1. We then refer to Qc[(i)] := Qc[(Pi)]
and Q[(i)] := Q[(Pi)] as, respectively, the sets of common no-arbitrage prices, and
no-arbitrage prices, of the structure (i) 2 SB.
Remark 2 A symmetric renement of any structure (Pi) 2 AS, that is, (P 0i )  (Pi),
such that P 0i = P 01, for every i 2 I, is always arbitrage-free along Denition 3. Hence,
any structure, (Pi) 2 AS, admits a self-attainable no-arbitrage price. Indeed, the
symmetric renement, (P i )  (Pi), such that P 1 = \mi=1Pi is arbitrage-free.
Claim 1 states a simple but useful property of arbitrage-free structures.
Claim 1 An arbitrage-free structure, (Pi) 2 AS, satises the following Assertion:
(i) @(zi) 2 RJm :
Pm
i=1 zi = 0 and V (!)  z > 0, 8! 2 [mi=1Pi, with one strict inequality.
Proof Let (Pi) 2 AS be an arbitrage-free anticipation structure and q 2 Qc[(Pi)] 6=
? be given. Assume, by contraposition, that there exists (zi) 2 (RJ)m, such thatPm
i=1 zi = 0 and V (!)  z > 0, for every 8! 2 [mi=1Pi, with one strict inequality, say for
! 2 P1. If q z1 6 0, then, q =2 Q(P1), which contradicts the fact that q 2 Qc[(Pi)]. Hence,
q  z1 > 0, which implies, from the relation
Pm
i=1 zi = 0, that q  zi < 0, for some i 2 I.
Then, from above, q =2 Q(Pi), which also contradicts the fact that q 2 Qc[(Pi)]. 
9
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3.2 Individual anticipations revealed by prices
Claim 2 tackles the notion of information conveyed by prices to individual agents.
Claim 2 Let (Pi) 2 AS, and q 2 RJ , be given. Then, for each i 2 I, there exists a
set, Pi(q) 2 ? [ A, said to be revealed by price q to agent i, such that:
(i) if Pi(q) 6= ?, then, Pi(q)  Pi and Pi(q) is q-arbitrage-free;
(ii) every q-arbitrage-free anticipation set included in Pi is a subset of Pi(q).
Proof Let i 2 I, q 2 RJ and an anticipation structure, (Pi) 2 AS, be given. Let
R(Pi;q) be the set of q-arbitrage-free anticipation sets included in Pi. If R(Pi;q) = ?,
the set Pi(q) = ? meets the conditions of Claim 2. We henceforth assume that
R(Pi;q) 6= ? and let fP ki gk2K be a chain of R(Pi;q), that is, a totally ordered (for the
inclusion relation) set of elements of R(Pi;q). We recall Pi is closed. By construction,
P i := [k2KP ki is an anticipation set, such that P ki  P i  Pi, for every k 2 K.
Assume, by contraposition, that P i =2 R(Pi;q), i.e., there exists z 2 RJ and ! 2 P i ,
such that  q z > 0, V (!) z > 0 for every ! 2 P i , and (V (!) z q z) > 0. Since, P ki  P i
is q-arbitrage-free for every k 2 K, the above relations imply, from Denition 3,
that  q  z = 0 and V (!k)  z = 0, for every (k; !k) 2 K  P ki . Since V is continuous,
the relation V (!)  z > 0, which holds for ! 2 P i := [k2KP ki , implies the existence of
k 2 K and !ki 2 P ki , such that V (!ki )  z > 0, which contradicts the above equalities.
Hence, P i 2 R(Pi;q). From above, P i is an upper bound of the chain fP ki gk2K in
R(Pi;q). Hence, from Zorns Lemma (see Aliprantis-Border, 1999, p. 14), R(Pi;q) has
a maximal element, that is, contains a set, Pi(q) 6= ?, satisfying Claim 2-(i)-(ii). 
3.3 Anticipation structures revealed by prices
The following Claim characterizes the no-arbitrage prices of Denition 3.
10
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Claim 3 Let a price, q 2 RJ , an anticipation structure, (Pi) 2 AS, and the related set
collection, (Pi(q)), of Claim 2, be given. The following statements are equivalent:
(i) q is a no-arbitrage price of (Pi);
(ii) (Pi(q)) is the coarsest q-arbitrage-free renement of (Pi);
(iii) (Pi(q)) is a renement of (Pi);
(iv) (Pi(q)) is an anticipation structure.
If q 2 Q[(Pi)] is self-attainable, the above renement, (Pi(q))  (Pi), is self-attainable.
Proof (i) ) (ii) Let q 2 Q[(Pi)] be given. From Denition 3, we set as given a
q-arbitrage-free renement, (P i ), of (Pi). Then, for each i 2 I, the set, R(Pi;q), of
q-arbitrage-free anticipation sets included in Pi is non-empty (it contains P i ), and,
from Claim 2, admits Pi(q) 6= ? for maximal element, that is, P i  Pi(q)  Pi and
q 2 Q(Pi(q)). These relations imply that (P i )  (Pi(q))  (Pi) and q 2 Qc[(Pi(q))], i.e.,
(Pi(q)) is the coarsest q-arbitrage-free renement of (Pi), since (P i ) was set arbitrary.
(ii)) (iii)) (iv) The relations are immediate from Denition 1.
(iv)) (i) If (Pi(q)) 2 AS, then, from Claim 2, (Pi(q)) renes (Pi) and is q-arbitrage-
free, that is, q 2 Qc[(Pi(q))]  Q[(Pi)].
The end of Claim 3, left to readers, is immediate from Denition 1 and above. 
Claim 3 permits to dene concepts of revealed and price-revealable renements.
Denition 4 Let an anticipation structure, (Pi) 2 AS, and a no-arbitrage price, q 2
Q[(Pi)], be given. The renement, (Pi(q))  (Pi), of Claim 3 is said to be revealed by
price q. A renement, (P 0i ), of (Pi) is said to be price-revealable if it can be revealed
by some price, i.e., there exists q0 2 Q[(Pi)] such that (P 0i ) = (Pi(q0)) along Claim 3.
Consistently, we say that an arbitrage-free anticipation structure is price revealable
and revealed by any of its common no-arbitrage prices.
11
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We now examine how agents, endowed with no price model a la Radner, may still
update their anticipations from observing market prices. The following sub-Section
generalizes a result of Cornet-de Boisde¤re (2009) to the above economy, E.
3.4 Sequential renement through prices
Throughout, we let an anticipation structure, (Pi) 2 AS, a generic agent, i 2 I,
and an asset price, q 2 RJ , be given. We study how this ith agent, endowed with the
initial set of anticipations, Pi, may update her forecasts from observing price q.
We thus dene, by induction, two sequences, fAni gn2N and fPni gn2N as follows:
 for n = 0, we let A0i = ? and P 0i := Pi;
 for n 2 N arbitrary, with Ani and Pni dened at step n, we let An+1i := Pn+1i := ?,
if Pni = ?, and, otherwise,
An+1i := f! 2 Pni : 9z 2 RJ ;  q  z > 0; V (!)  z > 0 and V (!)  z > 0; 8! 2 Pni g;
Pn+1i := P
n
i n An+1i , i.e., the agent rules out anticipations, granting an arbitrage.
Claim 4 Let an anticipation structure, (Pi) 2 AS, an agent, i 2 I, a price, q 2 RJ ,
and the information set, Pi(q), it reveals along Claim 2, be given. The above set
sequences, fAni gn2N and fPni gn2N, satisfy the following assertions:
(i) 9N 2 N : 8n > N; Ani = ? and Pni = PNi ;
(ii) PNi = limn!1 P
n
i = Pi(q).
Proof Let (Pi) 2 AS, i 2 I, q 2 RJ , Pi(q), fAni gn2N and fPni gn2N be set or dened
as in Claim 4, and let P i := \n2NPni = limn!1 & Pni .
With a non-restrictive convention that the empty set be included in any other
set, we show, rst, that the inclusion Pi(q)  Pni holds for every n 2 N. It holds, from
12
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Claim 2, for n = 0 (since Pi(q)  P 0i = Pi). Assume, now, by contraposition, that, for
some n 2 N, Pi(q)  Pni and Pi(q) * Pn+1i . Then, there exist ! 2 Pi(q) \ An+1i and
z 2 RJ , such that  q z > 0, V (!) z > 0 and V (!) z > 0, for every ! 2 Pi(q)  Pni , which
contradicts Claim 2, along which Pi(q) is q-arbitrage-free, if non-empty. Hence, the
relation Pi(q)  Pni , holds for every n 2 N.
Assume, rst, that P i := \n2NPni = ?. Since the sequence fPni gn2N is non-increasing
and made of compact or empty sets (this stems, by induction, from the fact that P 0i
is compact and An is open or empty), there exists N 2 N, such that Pni = Ani = ?, for
every n > N , and, from above, assertions (i)-(ii) of Claim 4 hold (with Pi(q) = ?).
Assume, next, that P i 6= ?. Then, P i , a non-empty intersection of compact sets,
is compact, and, from above, Pi(q)  P i .
For every n 2 N, let Zoni := fz 2 RJ : V (!)  z = 0; 8! 2 Pni g. Since fPni gn2N non-
increasing, the sequence of vector spaces, fZoni g, is non-decreasing in RJ , hence,
stationary. We let N 2 N be such that Zoni = ZoNi , for every n > N . Assume, by
contraposition, that assertion (i) of Claim 4 fails, that is:
8n 2 N; 9(!n; zn) 2 Pni  RJ :  q  zn > 0; V (!n)  zn > 0 and V (!)  zn > 0; 8! 2 Pni .
From the denition of the sets Pni and P
n+1
i 6= ?, the above potfolios satisfy, for
each n > N , jointly zn =2 Zoni and zn 2 Zo(n+1)i , which contradicts the fact Zon+1i = Zoni .
This contradiction proves that assertion (i) of Claim 4 holds, and we let N 2 N be
such that AN+1i = ?. Then, by construction, PNi = P i , and P i  Pi is q-arbitrage-free
(for AN+1i =?), which yields, from Claim 2, P i  Pi(q), and, from above, P i =Pi(q). 
The above inference process is a rational behavior, that we refer to as the no-
arbitrage principle, whereby agents, having no clue of how market prices are de-
termined, update their beliefs from observing them and ruling out arbitrage. They
13
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reach their nal update after nitely many inference steps. As long as markets have
not reached a no-arbitrage price, traders cannnot agree on prices and a sequential
equilibrium may not exist. Claims 3 and 4 show that agents have common updated
forecasts - a necessary condition of the sequential equilibrium - if, and only if, the
observed asset price is a no-arbitrage price. We have seen such prices always exist.
We will see below that equilibrium prices are always no-arbitrage prices, hence,
agents may infer their own anticipations from the observed equilibrium price. We
then speak of price-revealed equilibria. We now introduce and discuss the notion of
minimum price uncertainty of a private belief economy, and state our Theorem.
4 An uncertainty principle and the existence of equilibrium
4.1 The existence Theorem
In a private belief economy, there exists a set of minimum uncertainty about
future prices, any element of which can obtain as an equilibrium price for some
structure of beliefs today.
Denition 5 Let 
 be the set of sequential equilibria (CFE) of the economy, E. The
minimum uncertainty set, , is the subset of prices at t = 1, which support a CFE:
 = f! = (s; p) 2M : s 2 S; 9((!s); (i); [(xi; zi)]) 2 
; ! = !sg.
In Section 5, we will prove that  is non-empty and that a continuum of equilib-
ria exists in standard conditions. Thus,  is typically uncountable. Rational agents
forecasts of spot prices cannot degenerate to singletons, unless all agentsforecasts
are the same and common knowledge. In the economy, E , agentsinformation and
beliefs are private. So, each agent, i 2 I, should anticipate a typically uncount-
able set, Pi 2 A, of possible prices on each spot market tomorrow, whose eventual
14
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realization depends on all agentsprivate beliefs today. We retain the standard
small consumer, price-taker, hypothesis, which states that no single agents belief,
or strategy, may have a signicative impact on equilibrium prices. The economy, E ,
is said to be standard if, moreover, it meets the following Conditions:
 Assumption A1: 8i 2 I; ei >> 0;
 Assumption A2: 8i 2 I, ui is class C 1, strictly concave, strictly increasing.
The following Theorem states that a standard economy, E , admits a non-empty
set, , of minimum uncertainty, and that a C.F.E. exists, whatever their beliefs, as
long as agentsanticipations embed the set .
Theorem 1 Let a standard economy, E, and an anticipation structure, (Pi) 2 AS,
be given. Let  be the minimum uncertainty set. The following Assertions hold:
(i) 9" > 0 : 8(s; p) 2 , 8l 2 L, pl > ";
(ii)  6= ?.
Consistently with Assertions (i)-(ii) above, if the relation   \mi=1Pi holds, that is, if
every agents anticipations embed , then, referring to the notations of sub-Section
2.1, the following Assertions hold:
(iii) if the structure (Pi) is arbitrage-free, any beliefs (i) 2 mi=1 (Pi) support a CFE;
(iv) if a self-attainable renement, (P i )  (Pi), is arbitrage-free (and such renements
exist), any renement of beliefs, (i ) 2 mi=1 (P i ), as denoted in 2.1, supports a CFE;
(v) if (P i ) 2 AS is a self-attainable price-revealable renement of (Pi) (which exists),
then, every renement (i ) 2 mi=1 (P i ) supports a price-revealed CFE.
Remark 3 Assertion (iv) of Theorem 1 is a direct Corollary of assertion (iii), from
replacing the structure (Pi) by the arbitrage-free structure (P i ). We let the reader
check, as standard from Assumption A2, that if (i ) 2 SB and !0 := (p0; q) 2 M0
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support a C.F.E., then, q 2 Qc[(i )]. Consequently, if that supporting structure,
(i ) 2 SB, is price-revealable, then, it is revealed by the equilibrium price along
Denition 4, i.e., the CFE is price-revealed. Given this, Assertion (v) of Theorem 1
is a Corollary of Assertion (iv) and only Assertions (i)-(ii)-(iii) need be proved.
Before discussing the TheoremCondition,   \mi=1Pi, we prove Assertion (i).
Proof of Assertion (i) Let 
 and  be the sets of Denition 5, and let ! :=
(s; p) 2 , for some s 2 S, be given. Then, there exist prices, (!s) 2 s2S0Ms, beliefs,
(i) 2 SB, and strategies, [(xi; zi)] 2 mi=1 Bi(!0; i), such that C := ((!s); (i); [(xi; zi)]) 2 

and ! = !s . Let e := max(s;l)2S0L
Pm
i=1 e
l
is > 0 and  := sup @ui@yl0 (x; y)=
@ui
@yl
(x; y), for
(i; (x; y); (l; l0)) 2 I[0; e]2LL2, be given. Then, for each s 2 S0, the relations (xis) > 0
and
Pm
i=1(xis eis) = 0 hold, from Condition (c) of Denition 2, and imply xis 2 [0; e]L,
for each i 2 I. Moreover, the relations  2 R++ and p 2 SRL++ are standard from
Assumption A2 and Condition (b) of Denition 2 (applied to C). Let (l; l0) 2 L2 be
given. We show that p
l
pl0
6 . Otherwise, it is standard, from Assumptions A1-A2
and Conditions (b)-(c) of Denition 2, that there exist i 2 I, such that xli> 0, and
y 2 X(i), such that ! 7! y! is identical to ! 7! xi!, but on a small neighborhood of
!, where yl0! = xl
0
i! +

pl0
6= xl0i! and yl! = xli!   pl 6= xli! (for  2 R++ small enough),
which satisfy (y; zi) 2 Bi(!0; i) and uii (y) > uii (xi), thus contradicting the fact that C
meets Denition 2-(b). Then, we let the reader check from the joint relations p >> 0,
kpk = 1 and pl
pl0
6  (which hold for each (l; l0)2L2), that pl > " = 1

p
L
, for each l 2 L. 
We now discuss the Theorems Condition, encapturing an uncertainty principle.
4.2 The Theorems Condition
The Theorems Condition,   \mi=1Pi, is consistent with the models assumption
of price-takers agents seeing other consumersbeliefs as arbitrary. Then, , the
16
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set of all possible equilibrium prices, for some structure of beliefs today (which no
agent knows), may be seen as a set incompressible uncertainty. From Theorem 1,
the Condition,   \mi=1Pi, is su¢ cient to insure the existence of a CFE. It may
also be a necessary one, if beliefs are e¤ectively unpredictable and erratic enough
to let any price in  become a possible outcome. This situation may arise in times
of enhanced uncertainty, volatility or erratic change in beliefs, which lets no room
for coordination or agreement in anticipating a somewhat unpredictable future.
If cautious agents should embed the minimum uncertainty set into their antici-
pations, the question arises why and how this should happen. An emprical answer
may be that relative prices are often observable, on long time series, for virtually
all types of uncertainties, beliefs or states of nature, and would vary between ob-
servable boundaries. From the relative prices so observed, the set, , of tomorrows
realizable equilibrium prices, or a bigger set, might be inferred by the collectivity. In
addition, agents may have an idiosyncratic uncertainty, given their personal infor-
mation and beliefs, so their anticipation sets need not reduce to  or be symmetric.
We showed in Section 3 that agents, starting from any anticipation structure,
(Pi) 2 AS, could always reach an arbitrage-free renement, (P i )  (Pi), from observ-
ing market no-arbitrage prices. Without a price model, agents cannot infer more.
From Theorem 1, once they have reached the renement (P i ), all possible equilib-
rium prices at t = 0 are related to beliefs, (i ) 2 mi=1(P i ), which have the same
supports, namely, (P (i )) = (P i ). So, spot prices at t = 0 are no longer informative.
The rened anticipation sets of Denition 4, (P i ), are agentsnal information.
Under the Theorems Condition, that information is always consistent with a price
revealed equilibrium, no matter agentsprobability distributions on nal sets, (P i ).
In all cases, agentsnal beliefs, (i ) 2 mi=1(P i ), remain private. This privacy,
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agentsxed expectations sets, (P i ), and the Theorems Condition restore existence.
There can be no fall in rank problem a la Hart (1975). The generic ith agents budget
set and strategy are dened ex ante, with reference to ex ante conditions, and to a
xed set of anticipations, P i . So, only her ex ante span of payo¤s matters, namely,
< V;P i > := f! 2 P i 7! V (!)  z : z 2 RJg. That span is xed independently of any
equilibrium price, p 2   P i , whose location in the set  cannot be predicted at
t = 0 and will only be observed at t = 1. This setting is quite di¤erent from Harts.
5 The existence proof
Throughout, we set as given arbitrarily, in a standard economy, E , an arbitrage-
free anticipation structure, (Pi) and related beliefs, (i) 2 mi=1 (Pi) (using sub-
Section 2.1notations). They are, henceforth, xed and always referred to. Along
Remark 3, we need only prove assertions (ii) and (iii) of Theorem 1. The proofs
principle is to construct a sequence of auxiliary economies, with nite anticipation
sets, rening and tending to the initial sets, (Pi). Each nite economy admits an
equilibrium, which we set as given along Theorem 1 of [6]. Then, from the sequence
of nite dimensional equilibria, we derive an equilibrium of the initial economy, E .
5.1 Auxiliary sets
We divide Pi, for each i 2 I, in ever ner partitions, and let for each n 2 N:
Kn := fkn := (k1n; :::; kLn ) 2 (N \ [0; 2n   1])Lg;
P(i;s;kn) := Pi \ (fsgl2f1;:::;Lg]k
l
n
2n ;
kln+1
2n ]), for every (s; kn := (k
1
n; :::; k
L
n )) 2 SiKn.
For each (i; s; n; kn) 2 ISiNKn, such that P(i;s;kn) 6= ?, we select gn(i;s;kn) 2 P(i;s;kn)
uniquely, and dene a set, Gni := fgn(i;s0;k0n) : s
0 2 Si; k0n 2 Kn; P(i;s0;k0n) 6= ?g, as follows:
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 for n = 0, we select one g0(i;s;0)2P(i;s;0), for all s 2 Si, and let G0i := fg0(i;s;0) : s 2 Sig;
 for n 2 N arbitrary, given Gn 1i := fgn 1(i;s;kn 1) 2 P(i;s;kn 1) : s 2 Si; kn 1 2 Kn 1g, we
let, for every (s; kn) 2 Si Kn, such that P(i;s;kn) 6= ?,
gn(i;s;kn)
8>><>>:
be equal to gn 1(i;s;kn 1), if there exists (kn 1; g
n 1
(i;s;kn 1)
) 2 Kn 1Gn 1i \ P(i;s;kn)
be set fixed in P(i;s;kn); if 2 Gn 1i \ P(i;s;kn) = ?
2
This yields a set, Gni := fgn(i;s;kn) 2 P(i;s;kn) : s 2 Si; kn 2 Kng, and, by induction, a
non-decreasing dense sequence, fGni gn2N, of subsets of Pi, with a good property:
Lemma 1 There exists N 2 N, such that the following Assertion holds:
(i) 8(P i )  (Pi), (GNi  P i ), 8i 2 I)) (Qc[(P i )] 6= ?).
Proof see the Appendix. 
For every integer n > N along Lemma 1, and any element  2 ]0; 1], hereafter set
as given, we consider an auxiliary economy, En , which admits an equilibrium, Cn.
5.2 Auxiliary economies, En
We let NN := N n f0; 1; :::; N   1g, along Lemma 1, and set as given, for each s 2 S,
an arbitrary spot price, !N 1s := (s; pN 1s ) 2 Ms. Then, we dene, by induction on
n 2 NN , a sequence of prices, f(!ns )g 2 (s2S Ms)NN , which are, for each n 2 NN , the
second period equilibrium prices of the economy En , presented hereafter.
We now let n 2 NN be given and derive from the set, Gni , of sub-Section 5.1,
and prices, (!n 1s ) 2 s2S Ms, assumed to be dened at the last induction step,
an auxiliary economy, En , referred to as the (n; )-economy, which is of the type
described in [6]. Namely, it is a pure exchange economy, with two period (t 2 f0; 1g),
2 Non restrictively (up to a shift in the upper boundary of P(i;s;kn)), we assume that each g
n
(i;s;kn)
2 P(i;s;kn)
is in the interior of P(i;s;kn) 6= ?, to insure that i(P(i;s;kn)) > 0.
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m agents, having incomplete information, and exchanging L goods and J nominal
assets, under uncertainty (at t = 0) about which state of a nite state space, Sn, will
prevail at t = 1. Referring to [6], and to the above notations and denitions in the
economy E , the generic (n; )-economys characteristics are as follows:
 The information structure is the collection, (Sni ), of sets Sni := S [ eSni (and we
let S0ni := S
0 [ eSni ), such that eSni := figGni is dened for each i 2 I. The pooled
information set (of the states which may prevail at t = 1) is, hence, S = \i2ISni .
For each i 2 I, the set eSni := figGni consists of purely formal states, none of
which will prevail. The state space of the (n; )-economy is Sn = [i2ISni .
 The SnJ payo¤matrix, V n := (V n(sn)), is dened, with reference to the payo¤
mapping, V , of the economy E, by V n(s) := V ((s; pn 1s )), for each s 2 S, and
V n(sn) := V (!), for each sn := (i; !) 2 Sn. The payo¤matrix V n is purely nominal.
 In each formal state, sn := (i; (s; ps)) 2 eSni , the generic agent i 2 I is certain that
price ps 2 RL++, and only that price, can prevail on the sn-spot market.
 In each realizable state, s 2 S, the generic agent i 2 I has perfect foresight, i.e.,
anticipates with certainty the true price, say pns 2 RL++ (or !ns := (s; pns ) 2Ms).
 The generic ith agents endowment, eni := (enisn) 2 RLS
0n
i
++ , is dened (with reference
to ei in E) by enis := eis, for each s 2 S0, and enisn := eis, for each sn := (i; (s; ps)) 2 eSni .
 For every collection of the true market prices, !n0 := (pn0 ; qn) 2 M0, at t = 0, and
!ns := (s; p
n
s ) 2 Ms, for all s 2 S, at t = 1, the generic ith agent has the following
consumption set, Xni , budget set, Bni (Sni ; (!ns )), and utility function, uni :
Xni := R
LS0ni
+ ;
Bni (S
n
i ; (!
n
s )) := {(x; z) 2 Xni RJ :
2664 pn0 (x0 ei0) 6  qnz and pns (xs eis) 6 V n(s)z;8s 2 S
ps(xsn eis) 6 V n(sn)z; 8sn := (i; (s; ps)) 2 eSni };
20
 
Documents de Travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne - 2014.56
uni : x 7!
P
sn2Sni 
n
i (s
n)ui(x0; xsn),
where ni (sn) := i(P(i;s;kn)), for every (s; kn; sn) 2 Si Kn  (fig  [Gni \ P(i;s;kn)]), is the
probability of the set P(i;s;kn) 6= ?, along the belief i, and ni (s) := , for each s 2 S.
Theorem 1 of [6] and Lemma 1 above yield Lemma 2.
Lemma 2 The generic (n; )-economy admits an equilibrium, namely a collection
of prices, !n0 := (pn0 ; qn) 2 M0, at t = 0, and !ns := (s; pns ) 2 Ms, in each state s 2 S,
and strategies, (xni ; zni ) 2 Bni (Sni ; (!ns )), dened for each i 2 I, such that :
(i) 8i 2 I; (xni ; zni ) 2 arg max(x;z)2Bni (Sni ;(!ns )) uni (x);
(ii) 8s 2 S0; Pmi=1 (xnis   eis) = 0;
(iii)
Pm
i=1 z
n
i = 0.
Moreover, the equilibrium prices and allocations satisfy the following Assertions:
(iv) 8(n; i; s) 2 NN  I  S0, xnis 2 [0; e]L, where e := max(s;l)2S0L
Pm
i=1 e
l
is;
(v) 9" 2]0; 1] : pnls > ", 8(n; s; l) 2 NN  S L.
Proof see the Appendix. 
Along Lemma 2, we set as given an equilibrium of the (n; )-economy, namely:
Cn := (!n0 := (pn0 ; qn); (!ns ); [(xni ; zni )]) 2M0 s2S Ms mi=1 Bni (Sni ; (!ns )),
which is always referred to. The equilibrium prices, (!ns ) 2 s2SMs, permit to pursue
the induction and dene the (n+1; )-economy in the same way as above, hence, the
auxiliary economies and equilibria at all ranks. These meet the following Lemma.
Lemma 3 For the above sequence, fCng, of equilibria, it may be assumed to exist:
(i) !0 := (p

0 ; q
) = limn!1 !n0 2M0 and !s := (s; ps) = limn!1 !ns 2Ms, for each s 2 S;
(ii) (xis) := limn!1 (x
n
is)i2I 2 RLm, such that
P
i2I (x

is   eis) = 0, for each s 2 S0;
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(iii) (zi ) = limn!1(z
n
i )i2I 2 RJm, such that
Pm
i=1 z

i = 0.
Moreover, we dene, for each i 2 I, the following sets and mappings:
* G1i := [n2NGni = limn!1 % Gni  Pi;
* for each n 2 N, the mapping, ! 2 Pi 7! argni (!) 2 Gni , from the relations
(!; argni (!)) 2 P 2(i;s;kn), which hold (for every ! 2 Pi) for some (s; kn) 2 SiKn;
* from Assertion (i) and Lemma 2-(v), the belief, i := 11+#S (i + 
P
s2S s),
where s is (for each s 2 S) the Diracs measure of !s;
* the support of i 2 B, denoted by P i := P (i ) = Pi [ f!sgs2S;
* for all (! := (s; ps); z) 2MRJ , the set Bi(!; z) := fx 2 RL+ : ps(x  eis) 6 V (!)zg.
Then, the following Assertions hold, for each i 2 I:
(iv) Gni  Gn+1i , 8n 2 N, G
1
i = Pi and fargni (!)gn2N converges to ! uniformly on Pi;
(v) 8s 2 S, fxisg = arg maxx2Bi(!s ;zi ) ui(x

i0; x), along Assertion (ii); we let x

i!s
:= xis;
(vi) the correspondence ! 2 P i 7! arg maxx2Bi(!;zi ) ui(x

i0; x) is a continuous mapping,
denoted by ! 7! xi!. The mapping, xi : ! 2 f0g [ P i 7! xi!, dened from Assertions
(ii) and (v) and above, is a consumption plan, henceforth referred to as xi 2 X(i );
(vii) u
i
i (x

i ) =
1
1+#S limn!1 u
n
i (x
n
i ) 2 R+.
Proof see the Appendix. 
5.3 An equilibrium of the initial economy
We now prove Assertion (ii) of Theorem 1, via the following Claim.
Claim 5 The collection of prices, (!s) = limn!1(!ns ), beliefs, (

i ), allocation, (x

i ),
and portfolios, (zi ) = limn!1(zni ), of Lemma 3, is a C.F.E. of the economy E .
Proof Let C := ((!s); (i ); [(xi ; zi )]) be dened from Claim 5 and use the notations
of Lemma 3. From Lemma 3-(ii)-(iii)-(v)-(vi), C meets Conditions (c)-(d) of the above
Denition 2 of equilibrium. From the denition, f!sgs2S  \mi=1P (i ), so C meets
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Condition (a) of Denition 2. To prove that C is a C.F.E., it su¢ ces to show that
C satises the relation [(xi ; zi )] 2 mi=1Bi(!0 ; i ) and Condition (b) of Denition 2.
Let i 2 I be given. From the denition of Cn, the relations pn0 (xni0-ei0) 6  qnzni and
pns (xnis-eis) 6 V ((s; pn 1s ))zni hold, for each (n; s) 2 NNS, which yield in the limit (from
the continuity of the scalar product): p0 (xi0-ei0) 6  qzi and ps (xis-eis) 6 V (!s)zi ,
for each s 2 S. The relations ps(xi!-eis) 6 V (!)zi hold, for all (s; ! := (s; ps)) 2 Si Pi,
from Lemma 3-(v)-(vi). This implies, from Lemma 3-(vi): [(xi ; z

i )] 2 mi=1Bi(!0 ; i ).
Assume, by contraposition, that C fails to meet Denition 2-(b), then, there exist
i 2 I, (x; z) 2 Bi(!0 ; i ) and " 2 R++, such that:
(I) "+ u
i
i (x

i ) < u
i
i (x).
We may assume that there exists  2 R++, such that:
(II) xl! > , for every (!; l) 2 f0g [ P i  L.
If not, for every  2 [0; 1], we dene the strategy (x; z) := ((1 )x+ei; (1 )z),
which belongs to Bi(!0 ; 

i ), a convex set. From Assumption A1, the strategy (x; z)
meets relations (II) whenever  > 0. Moreover, from relation (I) and the uniform
continuity of (; !) 2 [0; 1]  P i 7! ui(x0 ; x!) on a compact set (which holds from
Assumption A2 and the relation x 2 X(i )), the strategy (x; z) also meets relation
(I), for every  > 0, small enough. So, we may assume relations (II).
We let the reader check, as immediate from the relations (x; z) 2 Bi(!0 ; i ) and
i 2 B (and the denition of a belief), from Lemma 3-(i), the relations (I)   (II),
Assumption A2, and the same continuity arguments as above (and the continuity
of the scalar product), that we may also assume there exists  2 R++, such that:
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(III) p0 (x0   ei0) 6     qz and ps(x!   eis) 6   + V (!)z, 8! := (s; ps) 2 P i .
From (III), the continuity of the scalar product (hence, of ! 7! V (!)) and Lemma
3-(i)-(iii)-(iv), there exists N1 2 NN , such that, for every n > N1:
(IV )
26666664
pn0 (x0   ei0) 6  qnz
pns (x!s   eis) 6 V n(s)z; 8s 2 S
ps(x!   eis) 6 V (!)z; 8! := (s; ps) 2 Gni
.
Along relations (IV ) and Lemma 3-(i)-(v)-(vi), for each n > N1, we let (xn; z) 2
Bni (S
n
i ; (!
n
s )) be the strategy dened by xn0 := x0, xns := x!s , for every s 2 S, and
xnsn := x!, for every sn := (i; !) 2 eSni , and recall that:
 u

i
i (x) :=
1
1+#S
R
!2Pi ui(x0; x!)du
i
i (!) +

1+#S
P
s2S ui(x0; x!s );
 uni (xn) :=
P
sn2Sni nS ui(x0; xsn)
n
i (s
n) + 
P
s2S ui(x0; x!s ).
Then, from above, Lemma 3-(i)-(iv) and the uniform continuity of x 2 X(i ) and
ui on compact sets, there exists N2 > N1 such that (with  := (1+#S)):
(V ) ju

i
i (x)-u
n
i (x
n)j 6 R
!2Pi jui(x0; x!)-ui(x0; xargni (!))jdu
i
i (!) <
"
2 , for every n > N2.
From equilibrium conditions and Lemma 3-(vii), there exists N3 > N2, such that:
(V I) uni (x
n) 6 uni (xni ) < "2 + u
i
i (x

i ), for every n > N3 (with  := (1+#S)).
Let n > N3 be given. The above Conditions (I)-(V )-(V I) yield, jointly:
u
i
i (x) <
"
2 + u
n
i (x
n) < "+ u
i
i (x

i ) < u
i
i (x).
This contradiction proves that C meets Condition (b) of Denition 2, hence, from
above, that C is a C.F.E. The sets 
, of C.F.E., and , of minimum uncertainty, of
Dention 5, which contains f!sgs2S, are non-empty, i.e., Theorem 1-(ii) holds. 
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Claim 6, below, completes the proof of Theorem 1 via the following Lemma.
Lemma 4 For each (i; k) 2 IN, we let k := 12k , denote simply uki := u

k
i
i and
by Ck = ((!ks); (ki ); [(xki ; zki )]) the related C.F.E., Ck, of Claim 5, and we dene the
set, Bi(!; z) := fx 2 RL+ : ps(x eis) 6 V (!)zg, for all (! := (s; ps); z) 2 PiRJ . Then,
whenever \mi=1Pi along Denition 5, the following Assertions hold for each i 2 I:
(i) for each s 2 S0, it may be assumed to exist prices, !s = limk!1 !ks 2Ms, such that
f!sgs2S  \mi=1Pi, and consumptions, xis = limk!1 xkis, such that
P
i2I(x

is eis) = 0;
(ii) it may be assumed to exist portfolios, zi = limk!1 zki , such that
Pm
i=1 z

i = 0;
(iii) 8s 2 S, fxisg = arg maxx2Bi(!s ;zi ) ui(xi0; x) along Assertion (i); we let xi!s := xis;
(iv) the correspondence ! 2 Pi 7! arg maxx2Bi(!;zi ) ui(xi0; x) is a continuous mapping,
denoted by ! 7! xi!. The mapping xi : ! 2 f0g [ Pi 7! xi!, dened from Assertions
(i)-(iii) and above, is a consumption plan, referred to as xi 2 X(i);
(v) for every x 2 X(i), uii (x) = limk!1 uki (x) 2 R+ and uii (xi ) = limk!1 uki (xki ) 2 R+.
Proof see the Appendix. 
Claim 6 Whenever   \mi=1Pi, the collection of prices, (!s) = limk!1(!ks), beliefs,
(i), allocation, (xi ), and portfolios, (zi ) = limk!1(zki ), of Lemma 4, is a C.F.E.
Proof The proof is similar to that of Claim 5. We assume that   \mi=1Pi and
let C := ((!s); (i); [(xi ; zi )]) be dened from Lemma 4, whose notations will be used
throughout. Given (i; k)2IN, the relations f!ksgs2S    \mi=1Pi hold from Claim 5,
and imply that P (ki ) = Pi, hence that, Bi(!0; i) and Bi(!k0 ; ki ) may only di¤er by
one budget constraint at t = 0. From Lemma 4, C meets Conditions (a)-(c)-(d) of
Denition 2. Moreover, for every (i; k) 2 IN, the relations pk0 (xki0-ei0) 6  qkzki hold,
from Claim 5, and, passing to the limit, yield p0(xi0-ei0) 6  qzi , which implies,
from Lemma 4-(iv) and above: (xi ; zi ) 2 Bi(!0; i), for each i 2 I. Thus, Claim 6 will
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be proved if we show that C meets Condition (b) of Denition 2. By contraposition,
assume this is not the case, i.e., there exists (i; (x; z); ") 2 IBi(!0; i)R++, such that:
(I) "+ uii (x

i ) < u
i
i (x).
By the replacing (if necessary) the better strategy, (x; z) 2 Bi(!0; i), by the strat-
egy [(1  )(x; z) + (ei; 0)] 2 Bi(!0; i), for  > 0 small enough, we may always assume
(from Assumptions A1-A2 ) that the rst period consumption, x0, is positive. Then,
from the relation (x; z) 2 Bi(!0; i) and Assumptions A1-A2, the relation:
(II) p0(x0-ei0) 6     qz, for some  2 R++, may also be assumed.
From (II), Lemma 4-(i), continuity arguments and the identity of Bi(!0; i) and
Bi(!
k
0 ; 
k
i ) on all second period budget constraints, there exists K 2 N, such that:
(III) (x; z) 2 Bi(!k0 ; i) = Bi(!k0 ; ki ), for every k > K.
Relations (I)-(III), Lemma 4-(v) and the fact that Ck is a C.F.E., yield:
(IV ) uii (x) <
"
2 + u
k
i (x) 6 "2 + uki (xki ) < "+ u
i
i (x

i ) < u
i
i (x), for k > K big enough.
This contradiction proves that C meets Denition 2-(b), hence, is a C.F.E.
The proof of Theorem 1 is now complete. 
Appendix: proof of the Lemmas
Lemma 1 There exists N 2 N, such that the following Assertion holds:
(i) 8(P i )  (Pi), (GNi  P i , 8i 2 I)) (Qc[(P i )] 6= ?).
Proof Let the arbitrage-free anticipation structure, (Pi) 2 AS, and sequences,
f(Gni )gn2N, be dened as in Section 5. For each (i; n) 2 I  N, we consider the vector
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space Zni := fz 2 RJ : V (!)  z = 0;8! 2 Gni g and its orthogonal, Zn?i , and, similarly,
Zi := fz 2 RJ : V (!)  z = 0; 8! 2 Pig and Z?i . We show, rst, that, for each i 2 I,
there exists Ni 2 N, such that Zni = Zi , for every n > Ni. Indeed, since fGni gn2N is
non-decreasing, fZni gn2N is non increasing in RJ , hence, stationary, that is, there
exists Ni 2 N, such that Zni = ZNii , for every n > Ni. From the denition, Zi  ZNii .
From the fact that limn!1 % Gni = [n2NGni is dense in Pi, we easily show, by con-
traposition, that Zi = Z
Ni
i (for all n > Ni, take zn 2 Z?i \ Zni , such that kznk = 1
and derive a contradiction). We let No = maxi2I Ni and dene the compact set,
Z := f(zi) 2 mi=1Z?i : k(zi)k = 1;
Pm
i=1 zi 2
Pm
i=1 Z

i g.
Assume, by contraposition, that Lemma 2 fails. Then, from Claim 1-(i) and
above, for every n > No, there exist an integer, Nn > n, expectation sets, (PNni ), such
that GNni  PNni  Pi, for each i 2 I, and portfolios, (zni ) 2 Z, such that V (!i)  zni > 0
holds for every (i; !i) 2 I  PNni , with one strict inequality. The sequence, f(zni )gn>No ,
may be assumed to converge in a compact set, say to (zi ) 2 Z. From the continuity
of the scalar product and the fact that, for each i 2 I, limn!1Gni = [n2NGni is dense
in Pi, the above relations on f(zni )gn>No , imply, in the limit, that V (!i)  zi > 0 holds,
for every (i; !i) 2 I  Pi, with one strict inequality, since (zi ) 2 Z. This contradicts
the fact that (Pi) is arbitrage-free. This contradiction proves Lemma 1. 
Lemma 2 The generic (n; )-economy admits an equilibrium, namely a collection
of prices, !n0 := (pn0 ; qn) 2 M0, at t = 0, and !ns := (s; pns ) 2 Ms, in each state s 2 S,
and strategies, (xni ; zni ) 2 Bni (Sni ; (!ns )), dened for each i 2 I, such that :
(i) 8i 2 I; (xni ; zni ) 2 arg max(x;z)2Bni (Sni ;(!ns )) uni (x);
(ii) 8s 2 S0; Pmi=1 (xnis   eis) = 0;
(iii)
Pm
i=1 z
n
i = 0.
Moreover, the equilibrium prices and allocations satisfy the following Assertions:
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(iv) 8(n; i; s) 2 NN  I  S0, xnis 2 [0; e]L, where e := max(s;l)2S0L
Pm
i=1 e
l
is;
(v) 9" 2]0; 1] : pnls > ", 8(n; s; l) 2 NN  S L.
Proof We recall that N := Nnf1; :::; N   1g, along Lemma 1, and let n 2 NN be given.
From Lemma 1 and the fact that S is a set of common states for all agents, the payo¤
and information structure, [V n; (Sni )], is arbitrage-free, along [6], Denition 4, p. 260,
on a purely nancial market. Moreover, the (n; )-economy is, formally, one of the
type presented in [6] and, from above, admits an equilibrium along Denition 3 and
Theorem 1 of [6] and its proof, more precisely (up to slightly changed notations),
it admits a collection of prices, !n0 := (pn0 ; qn) 2 M0, and !ns := (s; pns ) 2 Ms, for each
s 2 S, and strategies, (xni ; zni ) 2 Bni (Sni ; (!ns )), dened for each i 2 I, which satisfy
Assertions (i)-(ii)-(iii) of Lemma 2 (which, hence, hold). The proof of Assertions
(iv)-(v) is similar (simpler) to that above of Theorem 1-(i), hence, left to readers. 
Lemma 3 For the above sequence, fCng, of equilibria, it may be assumed to exist:
(i) !0 := (p

0 ; q
) = limn!1 !n0 2M0 and !s := (s; ps) = limn!1 !ns 2Ms, for each s 2 S;
(ii) (xis) := limn!1 (x
n
is)i2I 2 RLm, such that
P
i2I (x

is   eis) = 0, for each s 2 S0;
(iii) (zi ) = limn!1(z
n
i )i2I 2 RJm, such that
Pm
i=1 z

i = 0.
Moreover, we dene, for each i 2 I, the following sets and mappings:
* G1i := [n2NGni = limn!1 % Gni  Pi;
* for each n 2 N, the mapping, ! 2 Pi 7! argni (!) 2 Gni , from the relations
(!; argni (!)) 2 P 2(i;s;kn), which hold (for every ! 2 Pi) for some (s; kn) 2 SiKn;
* from Assertion (i) and Lemma 2-(v), the belief, i := 11+#S (i + 
P
s2S s),
where s is (for each s 2 S) the Diracs measure of !s;
* the support of i 2 B, denoted by P i := P (i ) = Pi [ f!sgs2S;
* for all (! := (s; ps); z) 2MRJ , the set Bi(!; z) := fx 2 RL+ : ps(x  eis) 6 V (!)zg.
Then, the following Assertions hold, for each i 2 I:
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(iv) Gni  Gn+1i , 8n 2 N, G
1
i = Pi and fargni (!)gn2N converges to ! uniformly on Pi;
(v) 8s 2 S, fxisg = arg maxx2Bi(!s ;zi ) ui(x

i0; x), along Assertion (ii); we let x

i!s
:= xis;
(vi) the correspondence ! 2 P i 7! arg maxx2Bi(!;zi ) ui(x

i0; x) is a continuous mapping,
denoted by ! 7! xi!. The mapping, xi : ! 2 f0g [ P i 7! xi!, dened from Assertions
(ii) and (v) and above, is a consumption plan, henceforth referred to as xi 2 X(i );
(vii) u
i
i (x

i ) =
1
1+#S limn!1 u
n
i (x
n
i ) 2 R+.
Proof Assertions (i)-(ii) result from Lemma 2-(iv) and compactness arguments. 
Assertion (iii) For all (i; n) 2 INN , we let Zi := fz 2 RJ : V (!)  z = 0;8! 2 Pig and
recall from the proof of Lemma 1 that Zi = fz 2 RJ : V (!)  z = 0; 8! 2 Gni g. We show
that the portfolio sequence f(zni )i2Ig is bounded in RJm. Indeed, let  := maxi2I keik.
The denition of fCngn2NN yields, from budget constraints and clearance conditions:
(I) [
Pm
i=1 z
n
i = 0 and V (!i)zni >  , 8(i; !i) 2 I Gni ], for every n 2 NN .
Assume, by contradiction, f(zni )g is unbounded, i.e., there exists an extracted
sequence, f(z'(n)i )g, such that n < k(z'(n)i )k 6 n+1, for all n 2 NN . From (I), the
portfolios (zni ) := 1n (z
'(n)
i ) meet, for all n 2 NN , the relations 1<k(zni )k61+ 1n and:
(II)
Pm
i=1 z
n
i = 0 and V (!i)zni >   n , 8(i; !i) 2 I Gni .
From (II), the density of G1i in Pi, scalar product continuity and above, the
sequence f(zni )g may be assumed to converge, say to (zi), such that k(zi)k = 1 and:
(III)
Pm
i=1 zi = 0 and V (!i)zi > 0, 8(i; !i) 2 IPi.
Relations (III) and the fact that (Pi) is arbitrage-free imply, from Claim 1, (zi) 2
mi=1Z

i and, from the elimination of useless deals (see sub-Section 2.4), (zi) = 0,
which contradicts the fact that k(zi)k = 1. Hence, the sequence f(zni )g is bounded
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and may be assumed to converge, say to (zi ) 2 RJm. Then, the relation
Pm
i=1 z

i = 0
results asymptotically from the clearance conditions of Lemma 2-(iv). 
Assertions (iv) is immediate from the denitions and compactness arguments. 
Assertion (v) Let (i; s) 2 IS be given. For every (n; ! := (s; ps); !0; z) 2 NNMsMsRJ ,
we consider the following (possibly empty) sets:
Bi(!; z) := fy 2 RL+ : ps(y eis) 6 V (!)zg and B0i(!; !0; z) := fy 2 RL+ : ps(y eis) 6 V (!0)zg.
For each n > N , the fact that Cn is a (n; )-equilibrium implies, from Lemma 2:
(I) (!n 1s ; !
n
s ) 2M2s and xnis 2 arg maxy2B0i(!ns ;!n 1s ;zni ) ui(x
n
i0; y).
As a standard application of Berges Theorem (see, e.g., [8], p. 19), the corre-
spondence (x; !; !0; z) 2 RL+MsMsRJ 7! arg maxy2B0i(!;!0;z) ui(x; y), which is actually
a mapping (from Assumption A2 ), is continuous at (xi0; !s ; !s ; z

i ), since ui and B0i
are continuous. Moreover, the relation (xi0; x

is; !

s ; z

i ) = limn!1(x
n
i0; x
n
is; !
n
s ; z
n
i ) holds
from Lemma 2-(i)-(ii)-(iii). Hence, the relations (I) pass to that limit and yield:
fx
i!s
g := fxisg = arg maxy2Bi(!s ;zi ) ui(x

i0; y). 
Assertion (vi) Let i 2 I be given. For every (!; n) 2 PiNN , the fact that Cn is a
(n; )-equilibrium and Assumption A2 yield:
(I) fxniargni (!)g = arg maxy2Bi(argni (!);zni ) ui(x
n
i0; y).
From Lemma 2-(ii)-(iii)-(iv), the relation (!; xi0; z

i ) = limn!1(arg
n
i (!); x
n
i0; z
n
i ) holds,
whereas, from Assumption A2 and ([8], p. 19), the correspondence (x; !; z) 2
RL+PiRJ 7! arg maxy2Bi(!;z) ui(x; y) is a continuous mapping, since ui and Bi are
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continuous. Hence, passing to the limit into relations (I) yields a continuous map-
ping, ! 2 Pi 7! xi! := arg maxy2Bi(!;zi ) ui(x

i0; y), which, from Lemma 3-(v) and above,
is embedded into a continuous mapping, xi : ! 2 f0g[P i 7! xi!, i.e., xi 2 X(i ). 
Assertion (vii) Let i 2 I and xi 2 X(i ) be given, along Lemma 3-(vi). Let 'i :
(x; !; z) 2 RL+PiRJ 7! arg maxy2Bi(!;z) ui(x; y) be dened on its domain. By the same
token as for proving Assertion (vi), 'i and Ui : (x; !; z) 2 RL+PiRJ 7! ui(x; 'i(x; !; z))
are continuous mappings and, moreover, the relations ui(xi0; x

i!) = Ui(x

i0; !; z

i ) and
ui(x
n
i0; x
n
i argni (!)
) = Ui(x
n
i0; arg
n
i (!); z
n
i ) hold, for every (!; n) 2 PiNN . Then, the uniform
continuity of ui and Ui on compact sets, and Lemma 3-(ii)-(iii)-(iv) yield:
(I) 8" > 0; 9N" 2 NN : 8n > N"; 8! 2 Pi,
j ui(xi0; xi!)  ui(xni0; xni argni (!)) j +
P
s2S j ui(xi0; xi!s )  ui(xni0; xnis) j < ".
Moreover, with  := (1+#S), we recall the following denitions, for every n 2 NN :
(II) u
i
i (x

i ) :=
R
!2Pi ui(x

i0; x

i!)di(!) + 
P
s2S ui(x

i0; x

is);
(III) uni (x
n
i ) :=
R
!2Pi ui(x
n
i0; x
n
i argni (!)
)di(!) + 
P
s2S ui(x
n
i0; x
n
is).
Then, Lemma 3-(vii) results immediately from relations (I)-(II)-(III) above. 
Proof of Lemma 4 It is similar to that of Lemma 3, hence, left to the reader. 
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